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SUMMARY 
Successful integration of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) into civil 
airspace will not only require solutions to technical challenges, but will also 
require that the design and operation of RPAS take into account human 
limitations and capabilities.  
 
Human factors can affect overall system performance whenever the system 
relies on people to interact with another element of the system. Four types of 
broad interactions can be described. These are (1) interactions between people 
and hardware, such as controls and displays; (2) human use of procedures and 
documentation; (3) impact of the task environment, including lighting, noise and 
monotony; and lastly, (4) interactions between operational personnel, including 
communication and coordination.  
 
In addition to the human factors that have been identified for conventional 
aviation, RPAS operations introduce a set of unique human challenges. The 
purpose of document is to raise human factors issues for consideration by 
workgroups of the ICAO RPAS panel as they work to develop guidance material 
and additions to ICAO annexes. It is anticipated that the content of this 
document will be revised and updated as the work of the panel progresses.       
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Definitions 
The following definitions are taken from the ICAO RPAS manual. Note.— Terms followed by one asterisk* 
have no official status within ICAO. A term that is used differently from a formally recognized ICAO 
definition is noted with two asterisks**. 
 
Autonomous operation*. An operation during which a remotely piloted aircraft is operating without pilot 
intervention in the management of the flight. 
 
Command and control (C2) link. The data link between the remotely piloted aircraft and the remote pilot 
station for the purposes of managing the flight. 
 
Continuing airworthiness. The set of processes by which an aircraft, engine, propeller or part complies 
with the applicable airworthiness requirements and remains in a condition for safe operation throughout its 
operating life. 
 
Detect and avoid. The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the 
appropriate action. 
 
Handover*. The act of passing piloting control from one remote pilot station to another. 
 
Human performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and 
efficiency of aeronautical operations. 
 
Remote crew member**. A crew member charged with duties essential to the operation of a remotely 
piloted aircraft system during a flight duty period. 
 
Remote flight crew member**. A licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the operation of a 
remotely piloted aircraft system during a flight duty period. 
 
Remote pilot. A person charged by the operator with duties essential to the operation of a remotely piloted 
aircraft and who manipulates the flight controls, as appropriate, during flight time. 
 
Remote pilot-in-command**. The remote pilot designated by the operator as being in command and 
charged with the safe conduct of a flight. 
 
Remote pilot station (RPS). The component of the remotely piloted aircraft system containing the 
equipment used to pilot the remotely piloted aircraft. 
 
Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). An unmanned aircraft which is piloted from a remote pilot station. 
 
Remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), 
the required command and control links and any other components as specified in the type design. 
 
RPA observer. A trained and competent person designated by the operator who, by visual observation of 
the remotely piloted aircraft, assists the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight. 
 
Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) operation. An operation in which the remote pilot or RPA observer maintains 
direct unaided visual contact with the remotely piloted aircraft. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Successful integration of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) into civil airspace will not 
only require solutions to technical challenges, but will also require that the design and operation 
of RPAS take into account human limitations and capabilities. The purpose of document is to 
raise human factors issues for consideration by workgroups of the ICAO RPAS Panel as they 
work to develop guidance material and additions to ICAO annexes. 
 
1.1 Definition and scope of human factors 
 
Safe and efficient aviation requires that human performance be considered at all stages of the 
system lifecycle, from design, construction, training of personnel, operation and maintenance. 
Human performance is sometimes considered when referring solely to the negative impacts of 
errors, procedure violations, physiological limitations and the like. However, there is increasing 
recognition that unique human characteristics, such as flexibility and the capacity for problem 
solving, can make a significant positive contribution to system performance.  In developing 
standards and recommended practices for RPAS, it is important to recognize that the people in the 
system can have both negative and positive contributions to system performance.    
   
The ICAO Human Factors Digest contains the following definition of the discipline of Human 
Factors: 
 
“Human Factors is about people … [and]…  their relationship with machines, with 
procedures and with the environment about them; and also about their relationships 
with other people”. (Page 1.2). ICAO Human Factors Digest 1. 216 AN/131 
 
This definition makes it clear that a consideration of Human Factors for RPAS must include the 
human interactions in four broad areas: 
 
1. Human interaction with machines (also called “hardware”) 
 Examples include the interface between the RPS and pilots, support technicians, and 
maintenance personnel.  
2. Operational procedures 
 Including checklists, policies, and procedures for pilots and air traffic control.   
3. Environment 
 Including lighting, time of day, and the presence or absence of noise, vibration or other 
sensory cues. 
4. Interactions with other people 
 Examples include crew coordination, and communication between pilots and air traffic 
control.  
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This view of human factors is also expressed in the SHEL model that has been promoted by 
ICAO (See figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The SHEL model. From ICAO Human Factors Digest 216 AN/131.  
 
 
In this document, we identify human factors considerations that deserve the attention of the 
RPAS Panel Workgroups. Using the workgroup tasks as the focus and the general framework 
described by the SHEL model as a guide, we have identified areas where the design of hardware, 
procedures, the environment, or interactions between people have the potential to significantly 
impact the performance of operational personnel. For each potential issue, we include a brief 
description, a list of standards or regulations where relevant, and recommendations for action to 
address the issue.   
1.2 Human factors and RPAS 
 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft have generally experienced a higher accident rate than conventionally 
piloted aircraft (Nullmeyer & Montijo, 2009). Many of these accidents appear to reflect the 
unique human challenges associated with piloting an RPAS, and design issues with the 
human/system interface (Williams, 2004).  Some general human factors challenges of RPAS 
flight and operation include the following: 
 
Reduced sensory cues – The rich sensory cues available to the pilot of a conventional 
aircraft include visual, auditory, proprioceptive and olfactory sensations. The absence of 
these cues when operating a RPAS can make it more difficult for the pilot to maintain an 
awareness of the aircraft’s state. Observations of airline pilots have indicated that “pilot 
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error” is a relatively frequent event, yet most of these errors are rapidly identified and 
corrected by the crews themselves (ICAO, 2002). The location of the RPAS pilot remote 
from the aircraft may make pilot self-correction more difficult.       
 
Design of the Remote Pilot Station (RPS) –Some current RPS have included pilot 
interfaces that would not comply with design standards for aircraft cockpits, and fall short 
of general industry standards for ergonomics and human/system integration. Some RPS 
are already starting to resemble control rooms more than cockpits. Human factors design 
standards will be necessary to ensure that this change occurs safely with a focus on the 
tasks of the pilot and others conducting the RPAS operations. 
 
Handovers  – Control of a RPAS may be transferred in-flight between pilots at the same 
control station console, between consoles at the same control station, or between 
physically separated control stations (Williams, 2006). Handovers can be a time of 
particular risk, associated with system mode errors and coordination breakdowns. Where 
the aircraft is capable of remaining airborne for an extended period, multiple pilot 
handovers may occur during the course of a single flight (Tvaryanas, 2006), with each 
handover contributing to a cumulative level of risk.    
 
Collision avoidance and separation assurance – In the absence of an out-the-window 
view, the pilot must rely on alternative sources of information, and is unable to comply 
with ATC visual clearances in the usual way. In collaboration with RTCA Special 
Committee 228,NASA is conducting studies  to define the requirements for RPAS traffic 
situational displays for separation and collision avoidance..  
 
Human factors implications of link performance – The transmission of radio signals, and 
the associated processing, may introduce operationally significant delays between pilot 
control input, RPA response execution, and display of the response to the pilot. These 
latencies will be particularly noticeable when the link is via a geostationary satellite, 
however, terrestrial radio systems may also introduce latencies. If pilot voice 
communications are transmitted via the control link, delays in voice communication may 
become noticeable in some circumstances. In the event of a link interruption, the RPA 
must be capable of continued flight in accordance with the expectations of the pilot and 
air traffic control.    
 
Flight termination considerations – In an emergency, the pilot of a remotely piloted 
aircraft may be required to attempt an off-airport landing, or destroy the aircraft by a 
controlled impact, ditching, or other method.  Although no lives are at stake on board the 
aircraft, the pilot is still responsible for the protection of life and property on the ground 
or in other aircraft. The information pilots will require to carry out such an action has to 
be determined when considering designs to support these tasks. The risk of inadvertent 
activation of the flight termination system must also be considered (Hobbs, 2010).     
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Management of the command and control (C2) link - In addition to flying the aircraft, the 
pilot must manage and monitor the C2 link. This requires the pilot to be aware of the 
current status of the control link, anticipate potential changes in the quality of the link as 
the flight progresses, and diagnose and respond to any changes that occur.  
 
Workload management – A challenge for the designer of the RPS is to maintain pilot 
engagement during extended periods of low workload, particularly when the pilot’s role 
is to perform supervisory control of automation (Cummings, Mastracchio, Thornburg, 
Mkrtchyan, 2013). In addition, the pilot must be prepared for the possibility that 
workload may increase rapidly.   
 
Maintenance considerations – Maintenance personnel will require the skills and knowledge 
to interact with a complex distributed system containing elements not typically supported 
by aviation maintenance personnel.  Troubleshooting and fault rectification of the RPAS 
may also have to occur while a flight is underway.  
1.3 Guiding assumptions 
 
In identifying potential human factors issues relevant to RPAS, we have been guided by the 
following assumptions. 
 
 A person will be in command of each RPAS. Fully autonomous RPAS operations will 
not be considered. 
 The simultaneous operation of more than one RPAS by one person will not be 
considered.  
 Risk management approaches may differ between RPAS and conventional aircraft due to 
the absence of human life on board RPAs. 
 RPAS operations will comply with existing air traffic procedures, except where a specific 
difference has been agreed upon.   
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2 Discussion of human factors considerations 
 
In the following sections we describe potential human factors considerations that relate to the 
work of the RPAS Panel. For ease of presentation, we have associated each consideration with a 
workgroup, however we acknowledge that in many cases the consideration will have implications 
for more than one workgroup. The RPAS Panel may decide that some of the considerations raised 
here will not require the attention of ICAO, however wherever in doubt, we erred on the side of 
including potential issues.  We have developed this as a working document. We will continue to 
work with the RPAS Panel workgroups and modify the list, removing items that are no longer 
relevant, and adding newly identified concerns. 
 
2.1 Personnel licensing 
 
2.1.1 Remote pilots and flight crewmembers 
 
LIC1: Define licensing categories for remote pilots and other remote flight crewmembers. 
Description Development of crew licensing categories will first require an analysis of 
the tasks that remote pilots and flight crewmembers will do to support a 
RPAS flight. The licensing categories that emerge may differ from those 
applicable to conventional aviation. Task categories include flight 
planning, ground preparation, takeoff or launch, cruise, and landing or 
recovery.   
 
Some key points of differences with conventional aviation are: 
 The preparation of flight plans may involve more specialist 
personnel for different types of missions and operations. 
 Ground support crew may have a larger role in pre-flight 
preparations because the pilot may not be with the RPA. 
 Pilots may be responsible for only one element of a flight. For 
example, one pilot may be responsible for takeoff or landing 
while other pilots may control the aircraft in the “cruise” phase of 
the operation. 
 The routine takeoff and landing may be highly automated, or 
completely automated. 
 Technical tasks, including the management of C2 links, may be 
performed by specialist personnel available to support the 
operation. 
 High levels of automation may reduce the need for manual flying 
tasks. 
 Sizes of aircraft can vary from very small to very large. 
 Operational missions include routings for surveillance around 
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geographical areas instead of from point-to-point and very long 
flight durations. 
 
All of these factors should be considered when developing the 
appropriate classes for remote pilot licensing. 
 
An important part of this effort will be to identify tasks that should be 
performed by licensed personnel and tasks that can reasonably be 
assigned to unlicensed personnel and tasks that must be performed by the 
Remote Pilot In Command (PIC) and those that can be performed by 
other pilots.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Determine the tasks required to operate an RPAS considering all of the 
factors and differences from conventional aviation, and use these to 
identify operationally relevant categories for personnel licenses.  
 
 
LIC2: Identify in detail the knowledge and skill requirements for remote PIC, remote pilots, and 
other licensed remote flight crewmembers.  
Description Pilot knowledge and skills requirements will be somewhat different 
dependent on the operations that they perform.  One consideration is 
whether they are conducting flights in visual line of sight (VLOS) or 
beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS), which require somewhat different 
sets of knowledge and skills. Other considerations include: 
 The designs of the RPA and their aerodynamic qualities 
 The decision making required to accomplish the operational tasks 
 The anticipated system management tasks and handling of 
malfunctions or functions that become unavailable 
 Communication and flight crew management tasks for different 
types of missions 
 Tasks that are particularly important for the Remote PIC 
 Mission needs for handing control of the RPA to other remote 
pilots within the same RPS or to a pilot in another RPS 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Conduct research to determine the knowledge and skill requirements for 
different potential operational scenarios, RPA designs, and RPS 
configurations. Document these as input to training requirements and 
determine the differences in knowledge and skill requirements that can 
contribute to the development of separate classes of remote pilots and 
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other licensed crewmembers. 
 
2.1.2 RPA Observers 
 
LIC3: Define licensing categories for RPA Observers. 
Description Similar to the development of crew licensing categories, developing the 
licensing categories for RPA observers will require an analysis of the 
RPA Observer tasks that will be required to support RPAS operations. 
This is a new type of role not currently involved in conventional aviation 
operations so a thorough task and activity analysis will be important. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Conduct task and activity analyses to define and document the tasks 
required by an RPA Observer considering the anticipate range of RPAS 
operations, different designs of RPAs, and launch and recovery 
possibilities. 
References  
 
 
LIC4: RPA Observer knowledge and skills. 
Description The RPA observer is a role that is not included in the manned aircraft 
operations.  The knowledge and skills for the RPA observer will need to 
be understood and documented as a basis for licensing and training. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Section 8.6 
Recommendations Conduct research to develop a description of the knowledge and skills 
required for RPA observers in all anticipated operating conditions.  Use 
the results to develop the approach to RPA observer licensing and training 
and update the standards. 
 
 
2.1.3 Maintenance personnel 
 
LIC5: Define licensing categories for RPAS Maintenance personnel. 
Description Similar to the development of crew licensing categories, developing the 
licensing categories for RPAS maintenance personnel will require an 
analysis of the maintainer tasks that will be required to support RPAS 
operations.    
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Maintenance personnel will be required to maintain all components of the 
RPAS, including the RPA, RPS, communications equipment, and other 
elements required for RPAS operation. Maintenance personnel may 
specialize in one or more of these areas and it may be appropriate to 
license for a subset of components. Other issues to consider are: 
 Some maintenance tasks are likely to require software skills 
 It is possible that some maintenance may occur while RPA is in 
flight 
 
Maintenance personnel may have a real-time role in flight, similar to 
flight engineer. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Conduct task and activity analyses to define and document the tasks 
required by an RPA Observer considering the anticipated range of RPAS 
operations, different designs of RPAs, and launch and recovery 
possibilities. Identify whether other credentials like “system engineer” or 
flight engineer license are required. 
References  
 
 
LIC6: Maintenance personnel knowledge and skills. 
Description Knowledge and skills for maintainers will depend on the components of 
the RPAS they will be tasked with maintaining.  These components 
include the RPA, RPS, communications equipment, launch and recovery 
equipment and anything else required for the particular RPAS operations. 
Maintenance personnel may specialize in one or more of these areas so it 
will be important to define the knowledge and skills for each one 
separately. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Identify the unique knowledge and skill requirements for RPAS 
maintenance personnel based on the tasks they may perform during 
anticipated RPAS operations. 
 
2.1.4 RPAS Instructors 
 
2.1.5 LIC7: Define licensing requirements for RPAS. 
Description It may be important to develop licensing categories for the instructors 
who will be providing training for all roles related to RPAS operations 
including remote PICs and other remote pilots and flight crewmembers, 
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RPA observers, and RPAS maintainers. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Conduct research to define the needs for licensing of instructors.  The 
licensing requirements may be different based on what training the 
instructors will be providing. 
References  
 
 
LIC8: RPAS instructor required knowledge, skills, and training. 
Description The required knowledge, skills, and training for RPAS instructors may be 
different from the same instructor roles for conventional aviation 
operations.  The differences should be considered when developing 
RPAS standards.  The knowledge, skills, and training requirements will 
be different for training remote pilots, other remote flight crewmembers, 
RPA observers, and maintainers. Experience requirements should also be 
considered such as whether pilot instructors will need to have experience 
as pilots, maintainers as maintainer, etc. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Section 8.5 
Recommendations Conduct research to determine the RPAS instructor requirements based 
on the anticipated RPAS licensing classes and training to be conducted.  
Use results to update the appropriate standards or create new standards. 
 
2.1.6 Validity periods 
 
LIC9: Consideration of the degradation of knowledge and skill retention for different licensing 
classes when determining license validity periods. 
Description Retention of knowledge and skills is dependent on the level of expertise 
of the pilot when they are first developed, the frequency at which they are 
used in daily activities, the importance that is placed on retention during 
the training process, and other factors.  Consideration of retention of 
knowledge and skills expected to be in different licensing classes may 
lead to determination of different validity periods for the licenses.  This 
applies to all licensing classes being developed (pilots, flight 
crewmembers, observers, maintainers, instructors). 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
The validity period for the completion of the theoretical knowledge 
examination is described in paragraph 8.4.30 in the RPAS Manual. 
Recommendations Consider the potential for retention of the necessary knowledge and skills 
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related to the different licensing classes being developed and use the 
results in determining appropriate validity periods for each license class.  
This should be considered in combination with developing the currency 
requirements. 
 
 
2.1.7 Practical skills tests 
 
LIC10: Description of practical skill tests for each licensing class. 
Description Unique skills should be identified. In contrast to conventional aviation, 
these may be less likely to involve manual handling and more likely to 
relate to management of automation.  
 
The RPAS Manual paragraph 8.4.36 states: The applicant for the issue of 
a remote pilot license should demonstrate the ability to: 
a) recognize and manage threats and errors; 
b) operate the RPA within its limitations or those limitations 
imposed by regulation; 
c) complete all manoeuvres with smoothness and accuracy; 
d) exercise good judgement and airmanship; 
e) apply aeronautical knowledge; and 
f) maintain control of the RPA at all times in a manner such that 
the successful outcome of a procedure or manoeuvre is assured. 
Each of these skills may require different means of accomplishment, 
demonstration, and evaluation if they are applied to different types of 
operations (e.g. VLOS, BVLOS) and RPS configurations that may apply 
to separate Remote Pilot licenses.  The resulting differences should be 
considered when describing the practical skill test requirements for each 
of the licensing classes. 
 
In assessing skills, it will be necessary to consider whether flight tests are 
necessary, or whether full simulations or part-task simulations will be 
sufficient. It is important to consider all skill requirements when 
determining the appropriate testing methods including the 
communication, decision-making, troubleshooting, and crew resource 
management skills. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 8.4.36 
Recommendations Consider the knowledge and skills related to the different licensing 
classes being developed and analyze each class for the appropriate 
practical skill test requirements. This should be considered in 
combination with the work on the knowledge, skills, retention, and 
currency requirements. 
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2.1.8 Experience and currency requirements 
 
LIC11: Description of experience requirements based on the licensing classes. 
Description The experience and currency requirements for different types of 
operations (e.g. VLOS, BVLOS) and RPS configurations should be 
considered when defining the basis for each licensing class. 
 
A pilot who only operates an RPAS in cruise may accumulate many 
flight hours, but never experience a takeoff or landing. Conversely, a 
pilot who is assigned takeoff and landing may accumulate significant 
experience with this phase of flight, while logging relatively few flight 
hours.  
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 8.4.38, 8.4.39 
Recommendations Conduct research to determine the differences in experience and currency 
requirements for the potential combinations of types of operations and 
RPS configurations that may be considered for licensing classes. 
 
 
  
16 
 
2.2 RPAS operations 
 
2.2.1 Implications of lost link  
 
No control link can be guaranteed to be available 100% of the time, and there will be occasions 
when either the forward link, return link, or both will be unavailable. Pre-programmed lost link 
procedures enable the RPA to continue flight until the link is resumed.  Anecdotal reports indicate 
that RPA pilots must take into account the possibility that each command sent to the aircraft may 
be the pilot’s last contact with the aircraft for some time, should a link interruption occur. 
Particular care must be taken if a command would produce an unsafe condition if not followed-up 
with additional commands. For example, it may be unsafe to turn an aircraft towards rising terrain 
if the safety of flight relies on successfully sending a subsequent command to turn away from the 
terrain.    
 
 
OPS1: Predictability of lost link maneuvers. 
Description The behavior of the aircraft in the event of a lost link must be predictable 
to the pilot and ATC.  For example, the RPA lost link maneuver may 
involve climbing, or flying to a pre-determined position. Different 
maneuvers may be programmed to occur according to the stages of the 
flight, and/or the lost link maneuver may need to be manually updated as 
the flight progresses (Neville et al., 2012).  Care must be taken to ensure 
that the pilot and ATC are not taken by surprise by the behavior of the 
aircraft during a lost link situation. It is likely that the aircraft flight plan 
will need to include information on the aircraft’s lost link programming.    
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Best practices for the management of lost link maneuvers should be 
examined, and the characteristics that produce safe and predictable lost 
link behavior should be determined.  
 
 
OPS2: Criteria for declaration of lost link. 
Description A lost link situation is defined by the C2 link not being available for a 
defined period of time.  It is unclear whether the duration of the link 
outages that triggers a lost link procedure should be specified in standards 
or guidance material, or should be left to the discretion of the pilot 
dependent on the particular operation. It is also possible that the trigger 
duration should be specified dependent on the phase of flight or 
operational environment. For example, in terminal areas, a brief link 
interruption may warrant the activation of a lost link procedure. In 
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oceanic airspace, it may be acceptable to wait longer before the aircraft 
activates its lost link procedure. In some situations, pilots and ATC may 
prefer to have the certainty of an aircraft continuing along a planned 
flightpath even if the link is interrupted, than having the aircraft enter a 
lost link procedure.   
  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The operations workgroup should consider whether there is a need to 
define the duration of a link loss necessary before a lost link is considered 
to have occurred.  Consideration should be given to the role of the pilot in 
determining the duration for triggering the lost link situation, as well as 
the relevance of differing flight phases and operational environments. 
 
OPS3: Frequently exceeding lost link threshold. 
Description Frequent nuisance lost link occurrences may lead pilots to use 
workarounds to avoid triggering the lost link procedure.  For example, 
anecdotal reports suggest that pilots have sometimes entered extended 
durations into lost link timers to ensure that the aircraft does not enter a 
lost link procedure.        
  
A balance may need to be reached between predictability of a flight and 
maintenance of control. In some cases it may be preferable to have an 
aircraft predictably maintain its planned flight path during a lost link, 
rather than execute a lost link procedure in order to re-establish link. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Research is needed on the operational impact of lost link occurrences and 
the strategies that may be adopted by pilots to prevent them and respond 
to them. 
 
 
 
OPS4: Potential for multiple simultaneous lost links. 
Description The RPAS manual section 4.4.4 considers the possibility that a 
widespread loss of C2 capabilities could result in multiple RPAs going 
lost link simultaneously.  This could involve, for example, the failure of a 
communication facility being used by multiple RPAS. 
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Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The panel should give consideration to the causes and consequences of 
multiple RPAs entering lost link procedures simultaneously. 
 
 
2.2.2 Pilot sensory considerations  
 
The lack of sensory cues available to an RPAS pilot is well-recognized. The pilot may have 
limited visual information from a camera (or no camera view at all), and have no access to 
information from the aircraft via auditory, somatic or olfactory cues. From time to time, there 
have been suggestions that the control station should provide a richer variety of cues, perhaps via 
on-board microphones or haptic cues. The reduced sensory cues make it more difficult for the 
pilot to detect undesired aircraft states such as unusual attitudes, turbulence or weather 
conditions. In addition to these well-covered issues, the following considerations deserve 
attention.    
 
OPS5: Flight crew interaction with aircraft. 
Description ICAO Annex 6 specifies that the pilot must ensure that the aircraft is 
airworthy before flight. In some circumstances, the pilot of a RPA may 
not see or physically interact with their aircraft, before, during, or after a 
flight. If the pilot does not have an opportunity for a pre-flight walk-
around, they are reliant on other personnel for information on the state of 
the aircraft. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The operations workgroup should consider how the absence of pilot 
physical examination of the aircraft may affect flight operations and 
safety. If considered necessary, alternative approaches should be 
identified. 
 
 
OPS6: Perceptual illusions of RPAS operations. 
Description The pilot of an RPAS may be exposed to a range of perceptual illusions 
and conflicts that do not occur in conventional aviation. A complete 
review of this topic has not been conducted, however the following 
examples are illustrative: 
Control-consequence incompatibility. If the pilot is in visual contact with 
the aircraft, and is facing in the direction of flight, or if the aircraft is 
shown on a map display aligned with the aircraft track shown as “up”, 
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control inputs will result in an aircraft maneuver that is consistent with 
the pilot’s point of view. For example, a left input will turn the aircraft to 
the pilot’s left. However if the track of the aircraft is not aligned with the 
pilot’s point of view, for example, if the aircraft is flying towards a visual 
pilot, or a map display is not aligned with track up, then control inputs 
may result in the aircraft turning in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
pilot’s point of view.  
Depth cues. The difficulties in judging depth from periscopes and 
cameras have been studied for many years (Roscoe et al., 1966). Camera 
views can produce misleading depth cues, some of which may be related 
to the lack of binocular cues. These may be particularly noticeable during 
landing.  
Camera direction. If a moveable camera located on board an RPA is not 
aligned as expected by the pilot, there may be an illusion of yaw, or other 
undesired aircraft state.   
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The potential for perceptual illusions in RPAS operations should be 
examined, and their impact on flight operations and safety evaluated.   
 
 
 
OPS7: Landing/recovery at aerodromes. 
Description In the cruise flight phase, an RPAS pilot lacking information from an out-
the-window view may be in a comparable situation to the pilot of a 
conventional aircraft during a flight in instrument conditions.  However, 
the comparison between conventional instrument flying and RPAS 
operations may not apply when the RPA is on the ground or in terminal 
airspace. The situational awareness provided by an out the window view 
may be particularly critical during taxiing and takeoff, and during the 
approach and landing phase.  Unless an aircraft is capable of a fully 
automated landing, the pilot currently requires visual reference with the 
runway (14 CFR 91.175).   
 
A subgroup of the RTCA SC228 C2 Working Group evaluated the needs 
for visual information to be available to the remote pilot in different 
phases of flight and operating environments. 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
14 CFR 91.175 Takeoff and Landing under IFR. 
Recommendations The workgroup should address the information needs of an RPAS pilot 
when making an instrument approach, and consider whether visual 
information is needed, or whether the necessary information can be 
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provided by other means.  Consider using the working paper from the 
SC228 visual considerations subgroup as input to build upon. 
 
 
2.2.3 Vigilance and fatigue 
 
Considerations of workload often focus on excessive task demands, however under-load can also 
create hazardous situations.  Highly automated aircraft, long duration flights, low workload, and a 
sleep-inducing control station environment may make it difficult for RPAS pilots to maintain task 
engagement. Interventions such as rest breaks bring their own hazards that must be managed. 
 
OPS8: Vigilance, low workload and monotony. 
Description The RPAS pilot may experience extended periods of low workload, 
particularly when the pilot’s role is only to perform supervisory control of 
automation (Cummings, Mastracchio, Thornburg, Mkrtchyan, 2013). It is 
well-established that humans have difficulty maintaining vigilance on 
tasks that involve long periods of monotonous monitoring. The pilot may 
have to make a rapid transition from an unstimulating period of 
monitoring to a period of high workload and quick decision-making. 
 
Control stations tend to be relatively quiet, air conditioned environments 
with low levels of noise. The experience of settings such as industrial 
control rooms and locomotive cabs indicates that such unstimulating 
environments can make it more difficult for personnel to remain alert, 
especially when fatigued. As a result, fatigue management may be 
particularly relevant to RPAS pilots.  
 
Well-meaning efforts to control distraction, such as eliminating windows 
or prohibiting visitors to the control station, may only serve to increase 
the monotony of the piloting task, thereby increasing risk.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The potential effects of low workload and monotony should be examined. 
Countermeasures to maintain vigilance should be identified. Care should 
be taken to ensure that interventions intended to reduce distractions do not 
have the unintended consequence of increasing monotony. 
 
OPS9: Rest breaks and crew rotations. 
Description During long-duration missions, rest breaks for RPAS pilots may be 
scheduled at appropriate intervals to manage fatigue and attend to 
biological needs.  It is not clear how frequently breaks should occur. The 
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rest pattern could be modeled on that currently used in long duration 
airline operations, or could follow a pattern similar to that of Air Traffic 
Control, where a break every two hours is typical.  
 
Rest breaks are likely to require the transfer of crew in and out of the 
crew position, with a resulting need for a handover briefing and the risks 
associated with breakdowns in communication. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consideration must be given to the need for rest breaks and crew rotation. 
This will be related to the consideration of procedures for handovers 
between remote pilots in one RPS and from RPS to RPS.  
 
 
 
2.2.4 Handovers 
 
The ability to completely transfer control between or within control stations is one of the key 
differences between RPAS operations and conventional aviation. Handovers have been identified 
as an area of increased risk in a range of industrial and transport settings, including aircraft 
maintenance, medicine, and air traffic control (Lardner, 2000). Handovers require special 
attention to ensure that the incoming and outgoing crews possess a shared understanding of the 
operational situation and that control settings are aligned between the two RPS.  
 
OPS10: Best practices for control handovers from RPS to RPS. 
Description Control handover is likely to be an area of risk for communication 
breakdowns and mode management errors. Before control is transferred 
from one RPS to another, it is necessary to ensure that both control 
stations have consistent settings. Several RPAS accidents have occurred 
when control has been transferred between RPSs which were set to 
different modes or settings. There is a need to define best practices for 
control handovers between RPS. Issues to be considered include: 
 The use of intentional link interruptions during handovers. 
 Is it acceptable for the giving RPS to relinquish control before the 
receiving control station has established link with the RPA? 
 Is it preferable to have an overlap period during handover, when 
both giving and receiving RPS have an uplink to the RPA. 
 The acceptability of two RPS simultaneously linked with the 
RPA. 
 How should the receiving RPS confirm that it has gained control 
of an RPA? For example, switching lights on and off, or moving 
a control surface? 
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 How should the receiving RPS confirm that it has gained control 
of the correct RPA? 
 Is voice communication between giving and receiving RPS 
necessary, or can handover be done safely with text-based 
communication?  
 Communication protocols to be used by crew during handovers. 
 Checklists and procedures to ensure that giving and receiving 
RPS are configured consistently. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
Section 2.2.3 of the ICAO RPAS Manual states that only one RPS should 
be in control of the RPA at a given time.  This would appear to preclude 
overlapping handovers during which the giving RPS maintains control 
until the receiving RPS has demonstrated control.   
 
Recommendations There is a need to develop procedures and guidance to be used for control 
handovers from one RPS to another.  Consideration should be given to the 
many varied factors involved with different types of operations and 
different operational environments encountered by the RPA at the time of 
handover. 
 
OPS11: Transfer of control between adjacent consoles in same RPS. 
Description Many RPS designs include side-by side consoles. It is not clear whether 
these should operate in a manner similar to a dual control aircraft (where 
at a given time, inputs can be made using either set of controls) or 
whether there should be a system to assign control to only one console at 
a time. If control is assigned, there must be a clear system to indicate 
which console has control.  
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The workgroup should consider the operational implications of transfer of 
control between adjacent consoles, and identify how this differs from the 
transfer of control between pilots in a conventional dual-control aircraft.   
 
 
2.2.5 Flight planning 
 
The pre-flight planning for an RPAS flight involves unique considerations. Three critical issues 
are outlined here: the impact of ultra-long duration flights, the need to plan for C2 link coverage, 
and planning for contingencies.   
 
OPS13: Planning for ultra-long duration flights. 
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Description Ultra-long flight endurance, ranging from days to weeks will change the 
nature of flight planning.  A single flight may involve multiple crew 
members, some of whom may have had no involvement in flight 
planning.  During flight planning, pilots may also need to consider 
longer-range weather forecasts, and must deal with the resulting 
reduction in forecast certainty when predicting weather conditions weeks 
into the future. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consideration should be given to the implications for flight preparation of 
long-duration flights.   
 
OPS14: Flight planning and C2 link considerations. 
Description During the flight planning stage, consideration must be given to the 
predicted availability and quality of C2 links. This will include 
contingency plans for lost links throughout the flight.    
 
Other issues to be considered include: 
 The impact of aircraft location on C2 link availability and 
quality. 
 The impact of aircraft maneuvers on C2 link availability and 
quality 
 The need to change C2 mode or frequency throughout the flight. 
 Pre-arranged frequency changes.  
 Predicted signal strength throughout the flight and locations that 
may involve an increased risk of lost link.  
 The potential impact of weather (e.g. thunderstorms) or other 
natural events on link quality.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The operations group should consider the unique flight planning 
considerations associated with the C2 link for the anticipated operations. 
 
 
 
OPS15: Planning for contingencies. 
Description In addition to the usual planning required for the flight of a conventional 
aircraft, the RPAS pilot must plan for RPAS-specific contingencies. 
These may include loss of link (uplink, downlink or both), loss of Detect 
and Avoid system, off-airport landing or ditching with no external view, 
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loss of on-board camera, and flight termination.   
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The operations group should identify the unique contingencies relevant to 
RPAS operations. 
 
 
2.2.6 Flight termination considerations 
 
In common with the pilot of a conventional aircraft, RPAS pilots will be faced with emergencies 
that require them to attempt an emergency landing, off-airport landing or ditching. Unlike the 
pilot of a conventional aircraft however, the RPAS pilot may also be required to intentionally 
destroy the aircraft in some critical situations. The absence of human life on board the aircraft 
markedly changes the nature of decision making in these circumstances. An important 
consideration is that the RPAS pilot and other personnel involved in the RPAS operation are 
exposed to virtually no safety hazards in this situation. The risks are borne instead by members of 
the general public. Research has established that the community tolerance of risk is greatly 
reduced in the case of hazards that are outside the control of the exposed population and where 
exposure to the hazard was involuntary (Slovic, 2000).       
 
 
OPS16: Decision making for emergency landings, flight termination or ditching. 
Description An RPAS pilot faced with an in-flight anomaly must decide on a course 
of action. The decision-making process may be complicated by a lack of 
direct sensory information from the aircraft. If the anomaly is considered 
to be inconsequential, the pilot may decide to continue the flight. 
However, if the anomaly has implications for the safety of flight or other 
people or property, the pilot may be faced with choices that may include: 
(1) landing at a nearby airfield  
(2) attempting a controlled off-airport landing or ditching  
(3) activation of a parachute system (if equipped) 
(4) destruction of the aircraft in flight, or an uncontrolled descent 
 
Each action may present hazards to people and property on the ground, 
and the pilot must balance a desire to preserve the aircraft and its payload 
with the need to protect the people and property on the ground.      
 
If time is available, the pilot may have an opportunity to consult with 
other operational personnel. This may be the case with High Altitude 
Long Endurance (HALE) operations.  Some current RPAS flights involve 
range safety officers. Even when a team is involved in a decision, the PIC 
must bear ultimate responsibility for the decision. 
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It is likely that some potential impact sites for flight termination will have 
been pre-selected. Nevertheless, the pilot may still require real-time 
information to ensure that the selected impact site is clear of people or 
property. Imagery from an on-board camera may enable the impact area 
to be confirmed as clear, however imagery that is transmitted over the C2 
link will be unavailable if the anomaly also interrupts the C2 link.  
Furthermore, if a terrestrial C2 link is in use, a lost link may occur when 
the aircraft descends below radio line-of-sight from the ground 
transmitter.  
 
The C2 link may be lost as the aircraft descends towards the landing or 
impact site. If a loss of C2 link is anticipated as the aircraft descends to 
the landing or impact site, it will be necessary to make imagery-based 
decisions at an early stage in the descent, and take steps to ensure that 
inappropriate lost link actions are not activated when the link is lost.   
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The workgroup should consider the tasks that must be performed by an 
RPAS pilot conducting an emergency landing, flight termination or 
ditching.  Consideration should include the information available to the 
pilot, the decisions that must be made, the timescale in which action must 
be taken, and the extent to which the pilot can control the RPA with the 
loss of the C2 link.   
 
 
 
OPS17: Insurance considerations and emergency decision-making.  
Description Emergencies may arise where a pilot will be faced with the choice of (a) 
terminating a flight and destroying the aircraft with minimal risk to third 
parties, or (b) attempting to land the aircraft, with the possibility that 
doing so may increase third party risk. For example, attempting to land a 
partially disabled remotely piloted aircraft may present a hazard to people 
under the flight path of the aircraft. It is possible that insurance 
considerations (for aircraft, cargo, or payload) could influence the 
decision making of an RPAS pilot when faced with the choice of 
continuing a flight or intentionally terminating the flight.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Current regulations and standards do not deal with situations where safety 
considerations warrant the intentional destruction of the aircraft.  
Recommendations 
 
The working group should examine current insurance practices for 
aircraft, and determine whether pilot decision making in the event of an 
emergency could be influenced by insurance considerations. 
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OPS18: Search and rescue. 
Description Due to the absence of on-board occupants, the concept of “rescue” of 
survivors is not relevant to RPAS. However, there may still be a need to 
search for the downed RPA and conduct recovery operations. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Situations in which it will be necessary to search for and recover 
wreckage from an RPAS should be determined, and appropriate protocols 
for search and recovery should be developed.  
 
 
2.2.7 Flight crew task responsibilities 
 
The unique aspects of RPAS operations introduce new crew responsibilities. Unlike conventional 
transport category aircraft, RPAS are not typically engaged in point-to-point flight, and flights are 
more likely to include unconventional flight patterns such as high altitude loitering.   Unique crew 
task issues are outlined below.  
 
OPS19: Control of a domestic RPA by a crew members in another state. 
Description An RPA conducting a flight entirely within the borders of a state could be 
operated by a pilot situated in a RPS located in another state. In some 
situations, crew members of a multi-crew operation could be located in 
different states.      
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The operations group should consider whether there are reasons to restrict 
domestic operations by crew members located in other states. 
 
 
OPS20: Pilot interactions with payload. 
Description The purpose of many RPAS operations is to carry a payload such as a 
camera or sensing equipment. It is unclear whether pilots should be 
permitted to perform payload-related tasks in addition to the task of 
operating the aircraft. Distraction of RPAS pilots by payload displays has 
been identified as a safety issue (Neville et al., 2012). 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The impact of various types of payload operations on the pilot’s primary 
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tasks should be considered.   
 
 
OPS21: Interaction with on-board autonomous systems. 
Description Despite reluctance on the part of governments to permit autonomous 
RPAS, it is likely that future RPAs will be equipped with a number of 
fully automated features designed to recover from undesired aircraft 
states. In addition to pre-programmed lost link maneuvers, RPAs may be 
equipped with automated terrain avoidance systems, automated collision 
avoidance systems, and geofencing features.  As these features will not 
typically activate during a normal flight, the pilot must maintain an 
awareness of the conditions that will trigger an autonomous aircraft 
maneuver, and the expected behavior of the aircraft in such situations 
must be anticipated.        
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The operations group should consider the pilot management of on-board 
autonomous features that will be activated during non-normal operational 
situations.  
 
 
OPS22: Unique human factors training requirements for crew tasks. 
Description RPAS crew may require human factors training tailored to RPAS 
operations. Topics could include:  risk management, flight termination 
considerations, communication and coordination between remotely 
located RPS, teleoperation, illusions of teleoperation, fatigue, 
maintaining engagement during long duration flights, management of 
automation, transitioning from on-the-loop to in-the-loop.   
 
The ICAO Human Factors Training Manual provides information about 
training that is useful to pilot in conventional aviation and may provide 
relevant information for how to address the unique situations encountered 
by the remote pilots. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
ICAO Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 8683) 
Recommendations The operations group should identify human factors knowledge and skills 
relevant to RPAS operations.  Consider providing input for updating the 
ICAO Human Factors Training Manual as well as the Annex 6. 
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2.2.8 Safety and security of the remote pilot station 
 
The physical location of the RPS will introduce new procedural issues for the crew relating to 
safety, security and personnel access. Different issues may apply to fixed RPS located in 
buildings to mobile RPS located in trailers or on-board vessels.  Consideration must also be given 
to crew interaction with security features intended to prevent unauthorized persons from taking 
control of an RPAS.   
 
OPS23: Physical safety and accessibility of the RPS.  
Description The physical location of the RPS presents new issues concerning safety 
and accessibility. Building access restrictions, security and safety features 
used in Air Traffic Control Facilities may provide a useful model. If 
multiple RPSs are located in a single facility, consideration must be given 
to the potential for a single failure to affect multiple RPS. Issues to 
consider include: 
 Procedures in the event of a fire or other emergency at the RPS. 
 How should access to the RPS be controlled?  
 Should the law allow a pilot to be arrested during a flight? 
(Morris, 2014). 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The workgroup should identify the safety and accessibility differences 
between a RPS located in a control room and a conventional cockpit and 
develop new policies and procedures that account for different potential 
locations of RPS.  The current policies and procedures used at air traffic 
control facilities may be useful during the evaluation. 
 
 
OPS24: Electronic security procedures. 
Description Electronic security features designed to prevent unapproved access (such 
as passwords or required logon credentials) could have unintended 
consequences. For example, security features create the potential for 
inadvertent electronic lockouts of authorized personnel. In such a 
scenario, the RPA might identify a genuine command from the RPS as an 
unauthorized command, or spoofing. An unintended electronic lockout of 
the pilot could be a form of contingency, alongside lost link, or pilot 
incapacitation. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Give consideration to the required level of electronic or software security, 
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and the potential for security features to create unintended consequences. 
Consider appropriate procedures to respond to an unintended lock-out and 
other potential scenarios. 
 
 
OPS25: Maintenance human factors. 
Description Maintenance error has been recognized as a significant threat in 
conventional aviation. Human factors interventions include designing for 
maintainability, improved procedures, and human factors training for 
maintenance personnel. Compared to the pilot of a conventional aircraft, 
the RPAS pilot may have greater difficulty recognizing and responding 
rapidly to a maintenance-induced problem.  
 
RPAS involve unique challenges for maintenance personnel. The RPA, 
RPS, and associated equipment must each receive preventative and 
corrective maintenance, and maintenance personnel will require a wide 
skill-set to deal with diverse components including communication 
equipment, computer interfaces in the RPS, and potentially 
unconventional RPA components such as electric engines. Additional 
maintenance-related human factors considerations are: 
 
 Some RPA will require assembly and disassembly between 
flights, with a resulting increased potential for errors in assembly 
and connections. 
 Maintenance personnel could be called on to respond to faults in 
the RPS while the RPA is airborne. Procedures will be required to 
deal with this eventuality.  
 Systems are more likely to involve consumer electronics and 
computer systems, and maintainers must have the skills necessary 
to interact with these systems. 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
The FAA has released extensive guidance material on human factors in 
airline maintenance. 
Recommendations ICAO should consider the unique challenges of RPAS maintenance and 
consider whether guidance material is needed on RPAS maintenance 
human factors. 
 
OPS26: Intentional acts of operational personnel. 
Description On several occasions, airline pilots have intentionally crashed or hijacked 
their own aircraft. These actions may stem from a variety of factors, 
including psychiatric conditions, personal grievances, or ideological 
motives.  
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Remote pilots and other RPAS operational personnel could potentially 
carry out a malicious act without personal exposure to physical danger.  
 
The complex nature of an RPAS, with distributed interconnected 
elements supported by specialist personnel, may provide opportunities for 
a variety of individuals to carry out a malicious act without being 
immediately detected.      
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations The RPAS panel should seek specialist expertise on this topic, and should 
consider appropriate measures to counter the risk of malicious acts by 
operational personnel.  
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2.3 Airworthiness 
 
There are many human factors considerations that may be helpful when reviewing and updating 
the Airworthiness standards in Annex 8 and the related sections in the RPAS Manual.  The issues 
presented here are organized by using the sections of Annex 8 starting with Initial Certification 
(with the relevant subsections from the Annex) and then Continuing Airworthiness. As such, 
these considerations do not include the detail that would be addressed by airworthiness 
regulations such as those in Parts 23 and 25 or the US and EASA regulations (see Jones et al 
2012 and 2013 for a detailed review of US regulations related to RPAS design). 
2.3.1 Initial certification 
 
The human factors considerations related to Initial Certification are focused on the certification 
processes, then the certification of the RPAS as a whole, the RPA, RPS, and C2 link. 
 
2.3.1.1 RPAS design and certification 
The issues in this section impact the interaction of more than one of the RPAS components.  In 
subsequent sections we will present issues that related to each of the RPAS components (e.g. 
RPA, RPS, C2 link).  The primary human factors issue related to the full RPAS is the allocation 
of functions and tasks across the RPAS and the levels of automation employed in the design.  
This issue is presented first along with an issue about the PIC remaining aware of the automated 
systems.  These are followed by issues associated with specific sections of Annex 8. 
 
2.3.1.1.1 Function allocation and levels of automation 
AIR1: Defining function allocation and pilot tasks. 
Description Defining the role of the pilot within the RPAS is part of the decision for 
allocation between the functions of automated systems and the tasks 
remote PIC and other pilots, flight crew members, or remote observers.  
The function allocation decisions must be made in ways that allow the 
PIC to maintain the appropriate levels of control, authority, and 
responsibility for the RPA and the flight operations.  This issue is related 
to the resolution of many of the other issues the come together to 
determine the design of the full suite of automated systems that comprise 
the RPAS. 
 
The types of control tasks that the pilot will perform will be important to 
address.  When the pilot is required to perform continuous control tasks 
(like manually flying the RPA) it will require other parts of the system to 
be able to support those tasks. The timeliness of the interaction of the 
pilot inputs and the RPA responses through the C2 link will be higher for 
continuous control tasks. 
Related regulations  
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or standards 
Recommendations Conduct research to define the expectations for minimum and maximum 
levels of automation that will be required in the safe design of an RPAS. 
The analyses should be accomplished to understand the approaches to 
automated system design for which the PIC has the level of control 
required for all anticipated operating conditions. One research strategy 
would be to define the following information for each approach to 
automated system design being considered: 
 Operating modes 
 Principles underlying mode transitions 
 Mode annunciation schemes 
 Automation engagement/disengagement principles 
 Preliminary logic diagrams 
These attributes of the candidate automated system design can be 
compared and evaluated to determine the boundaries of what will be 
acceptable in the standards and recommended practices. 
 
AIR2: Ensure that the PIC will be able to maintain awareness of the state and behavior for all 
modes of the automated systems. 
Description It is important for the PIC to be able to maintain awareness of the state 
and behavior of all automated systems that are included in the RPAS 
design.  Three types of automated systems should be considered, not just 
control automation. 
• Control automation 
– The functions of control automation are to control and 
direct the airplane 
• Information automation 
– The functions of information automation are related to 
the management and presentation of flight-relevant 
information 
• Management automation 
– The functions of management automation are to permit 
strategic planning and control of the aircraft operation 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Conduct research and analyses to determine the acceptable approaches to 
maintaining awareness of the state and behavior of the automated 
systems.  One approach would be for the research should include the 
following.  
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• Address 3 types of automation 
• Address all phases of flight and anticipate operational conditions 
• For each type of automation and phase of flight, assess the impact 
of automated system designs on potential PIC  awareness 
 
 
AIR3: Reduced sensory information. 
Description The reduced sensory cues available to the RPAS pilot make it more 
challenging for the pilot to maintain awareness of the state of the aircraft, 
its operation, and environment.  The extent to which conventional pilots 
rely on rich sensory cues, in addition to cockpit instruments, is difficult to 
quantify. However, such cues may play a significant role in maintaining 
pilot situational awareness. 
As noted in the RPAS Manual 13.6.1, the absent cues include: 
a) visual sensory information; 
b) auditory sensory information (noise environment including 
engine and airframe noise); 
c) proprioceptive sensory information (e.g. vibration and 
acceleration); 
d) olfactory sensory information (smell); 
e) tactile sensory information (e.g. heat and vibration); and 
f) other sensory information (e.g. heat and pressure). 
 
Some RPAS designers have attempted to compensate for the lack of rich 
sensory cues with text-based displays in the RPS. However, this risks 
overloading the visual channel of the pilot and requiring the pilot to 
invest the limited resource of foveal vision to obtain information that 
would be available to a conventional pilot via other sensory channels.  
The fovea of the eye perceives a few degrees of the visual field on either 
side of the direction of gaze, and sharp color vision only occurs in this 
area. Peripheral vision is useful for detecting cues such as movement, 
change, and optical flow, however text is not read with peripheral vision.  
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 13.6.1 
Recommendations Conduct research to define the impact of the loss of each type of sensory 
information and the compensating information that will be included in the 
standards to maintain safe operations.   
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2.3.1.1.2 Controllability 
 
AIR4: Ensuring controllability under all anticipated operating conditions, transitions between 
operating conditions, and all flight stages and aeroplane configurations. 
Description The introduction of the C2 control link through which the PIC will be 
controlling the RPA impacts the means by which controllability is 
defined, evaluated, and tested.  
 
Appendix 8 Section 2.3.1 states that the aeroplane shall be controllable 
and manoeuverable under all anticipated operating conditions…without 
requiring exceptional skill, alertness or strength on the part of the pilot.  It 
also states that  
a) The PIC shall be able to make a smooth transition from one 
operating condition to another without requiring exceptional 
skill, alertness or strength on the part of the pilot.  
It is important to consider all anticipated transitions as the pilot is 
controlling the RPA through the C2 link. 
b) A technique for safely controlling the aeroplane shall be 
established for all stages of flight and aeroplane configurations 
for which performance is scheduled.   
The technique may include the combination of PIC manual 
control, control through automation, or algorithms that reside on 
the RPA for autonomous control. Developing and describing 
what will be considered techniques for “safely controlling” the 
RPA in all conditions will be an important issue. 
c) The pilot shall be able to safely control the aeroplane without 
requiring exceptional skill, alertness or strength on the part of 
the pilot even in the event of failure of any engine.  
This includes when an engine is lost during take-off and all other 
flight stages. It will be important to ensure that the loss of an 
engine and any resulting power surges or other changes to the 
electrical system in the RPA does not impact the C2 radio and 
link such that it would impact the ability of the PIC to control the 
RPA. 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
Appendix 8 Section 2.3.1 all paragraphs 
Recommendations Conduct research to understand the impact of the PIC controlling the RPA 
through the C2 link on the standards for designing, demonstrating, and 
testing controllability for the RPAS Airworthiness certification.  It may be 
beneficial for the analyses to include controllability scenarios for all 
operating conditions, differing levels of automation and the range of 
expected performance for the C2 link.  Specific attention needs to be paid 
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to transitioning between operating conditions, conducting take-offs and 
landings, and handling engine failure situations.  The analyses will need 
to ensure that the control of the RPA does not require exceptional skill, 
alertness or strength on the part of the remote pilot. 
 
It will also be important to address the impact of any engine failure on the 
ability of the pilot to control the airplane using the C2 link. 
 
2.3.1.1.3 Control system  
 
 
AIR5: Control system design. 
Description Appendix 8 4.1.6 on systems design features states that  
Special consideration shall be given to design features that affect the 
ability of the flight crew to maintain controlled flight. This shall include 
at least the following:   
 
a) Controls and control systems. The design of the controls and control 
systems shall be such as to minimize the possibility of jamming*, 
inadvertent operations, and unintentional engagement of control 
surface locking devices. 
It is important to consider the impact of the C2 link on the design and 
evaluation of the control system to ensure that all aspects of this 
paragraph are addressed and the PIC can maintain control of the RPA. 
 
We note that the term “jamming” as used currently in Appendix 8, refers 
to a mechanical system becoming seized or stuck. There needs to be a 
clear distinction between this meaning of the word and “jamming” 
involving intentional interference with a radio signal. 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
Appendix 8 paragraph 4.1.6 a 
Recommendations Analyze the impact of having the C2 link and as part of the control 
system related to the possibility of jamming (meaning seized or stuck), 
inadvertent operations, and unintentional engagement of control surface 
locking devices.  The potential for the C2 link to fade or be susceptible to 
interference will be important aspects to consider in the analysis. 
 
2.3.1.1.4 Stalling 
 
AIR6: Ensuring timely detection and response to a stall with use of the C2 link. 
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Description Response to a stall is a critical manoeuver to maintain safety or the RPA 
and any other aircraft or property that could be hit by the RPA if the stall 
was not recovered.  There have been accidents documented that have 
resulted from the inability of the pilot to detect and recover from a stall. It 
is important to ensure that a stall condition is detected by the PIC in time 
to make a response to avoid or recover from the stall and this may be 
more difficult with control through the C2 control link is than in manned 
aircraft. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
Appendix 8 Section 2.3.4 
Recommendations Analyze the impact of controlling the RPA through the C2 link on 
recognizing and recovering from a stall.  Use the analysis results to 
inform the design, procedures, and training related to stall recognition and 
recovery. 
 
2.3.1.2 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) design and certification 
 
AIR7: Minimize risk of unidentified damage to RPA due to ground handling. 
Description Damage to the RPA that remains unnoticed can be a risk to safe 
operations.  In many cases the PIC will not have an opportunity to 
conduct a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft, and so any damage must be 
evident to ground handling personnel. The use of composite materials 
may increase the possibility that structural damage may not be clearly 
evident during a general visual inspection. Technologies such as bruising 
materials or coatings may help to make damage clearly evident (Withey 
et al.,2012). Furthermore, RPAs that are disassembled between flight, or 
transported to the launch area via ground vehicles, may be more 
susceptible to damage and incorrect assembly. There have been cases of 
small UAVs that crashed after being incorrectly assembled when being 
prepared for flight (Hobbs & Herwitz, 2009). If elements of the RPA 
need to be routinely assembled before flight (e.g. wings connected to 
fuselage), the components should be designed to make incorrect assembly 
clearly evident.  If the PIC does not conduct preflight inspections of the 
RPA, procedures should be in place for effective evaluation and 
communication of the RPA condition. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
Annex 8 paragraph 4.1.8 
Recommendations Consider the potential for RPA damage due to ground activities when 
developing updates to the RPAS manual and Annex 8.  Updates should 
also address standards and best practices for ensuring that damage of any 
kind is identified, communicated to the PIC, and addressed appropriately. 
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2.3.1.3 Remote Pilot Station (RPS) design and certification  
 
2.3.1.3.1 Reliability 
 
AIR8: Reliability of RPS systems, displays, controls, instruments, and equipment. 
Description The systems that have been used in existing RPS frequently contain 
equipment based on off-the-shelf consumer hardware and software that 
would not meet the software reliability standards required for manned 
aircraft.  RPAS incidents have occurred in which screens have frozen, 
computer systems have slowed, and controls have become unresponsive.  
 
It will be important to ensure that the reliability of the systems in the RPS 
meet the requirements for the appropriate regulations for type 
certification. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consider how the system reliability requirements in the manned aviation 
standards and regulations will be applied to the RPS airworthiness 
processes.  The analyses should focus on whether there are reductions in 
reliability that are acceptable to include these types of systems or whether 
the RPS systems will need to comply by being developed on more 
reliable platforms. 
 
2.3.1.3.2 RPS displays and controls 
 
AIR9: Standards for RPS displays and controls. 
Description There are currently no standards specifically for the design of displays 
and controls in the RPS. Pilot interfaces currently used in RPS differ 
significantly from those used in traditional cockpits. Many RPS designs 
utilize “point and click” input devices, keyboards, trackballs or mice, 
desktop computer screens, and computer interfaces based on menu 
structures and dialog boxes (Williams, 2007).  Computer systems are 
frequently adapted from consumer off-the-shelf products, and sometimes 
use widely-available consumer operating systems.  Duplicated, side-by-
side consoles are common, enabling control to be switched between 
consoles. 
 
The relative spaciousness of the RPS compared to a traditional cockpit 
enables additional screens to be added easily when a need for an 
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additional display is recognized. Not only may additional information 
displays affect the pilot’s interaction with the RPS, but it is unclear 
whether the addition of a display to a control room should be considered 
a modification. Computer displays also provide a great deal of flexibility, 
enabling information displays to be rearranged, moved within a screen.      
  
Regulatory authorities must decide whether to apply existing cockpit 
design rules to RPS, or permit interfaces that have not traditionally been 
used in the aviation industry. 
 
Most existing RPS designs could not be approved under current manned 
aircraft certification regulations and requirements. Standards for display 
and controls are well established for manned aircraft, but they may not be 
appropriate for RPS controls, especially as RPS configurations are less 
similar to the manned flight deck. 
 
Among the issues to be considered are: 
 The need for feedback on crew inputs. 
 Error management with computer-based controls, including the 
ability to detect and recover from errors. 
 Design features necessary to support control transfers. 
 The extent to which individualization or modification of 
interfaces should be possible. 
 Approaches to compensate for reduced sensory cues. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
EASA CS 25.1302 and AMC 25.1302 
FAA 14 CFR 25.1302 and AC 25.1302 
Recommendations Conduct research to define the modifications that could be appropriate for 
design standards without reducing the level of safety. Consider the 
information being developed by others, including RPS design guidelines 
being developed by NASA (Hobbs & Shively, 2013). 
 
AIR10: PIC access to dedicated back up for critical controls. 
Description There have been RPAS incidents in which the PIC has lost the 
functionality of the primary controls and switched to the secondary pilot 
station to control the RPA.   
It will be important to ensure that the PIC has access to all critical 
controls in normal, non-normal, and emergency situations, including loss 
of control station function necessitating switching to a secondary set of 
controls.   
 
This issue of availability of back up controls is related to the issue of 
ensuring the reliability of the control station functionality including all 
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displays, controls, instruments, and equipment needed by the PIC to 
accomplish their tasks.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consider the needs for dedicated back up controls for critical control 
functions.  These activities should be coordinated with those related to the 
standards for reliability of systems and controls.   
 
 
AIR11: Separate flight controls and payload controls. 
Description Several existing RPS designs possess shared interface devices that can be 
switched to control either payload or flight controls. This arrangement 
has led to significant design-induced errors.  Payload controls should be 
separate and distinct from aircraft controls. 
 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consider the need to ensure that payload controls are separate and distinct 
from aircraft controls.    
 
 
2.3.1.3.3 RPS security 
 
AIR12: Maintaining security of RPS and flight crew. 
Description Unauthorized access to the RPS or RPS equipment may have security 
implications with the possibility of interference of control of the RPA in 
ways that could have safety consequences. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
Annex 8 Section 11.3 
Recommendations Conduct an assessment to define security-related design and procedure 
requirements for different types of RPS facilities and equipment.  For 
example, are there security measures that need to be in place for RPS 
environments that are not in an enclosed facility and, if so, what are those 
requirements?  The assessment must consider the potential for distraction 
of the RPA PIC to implement the security measures and ensure that there 
is no excessive impact on pilot tasks or attention. 
The resulting requirements should also consider procedures for handing 
over control from one RPA PIC to another. 
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2.3.1.4 C2 Link as part of certification 
 
AIR13: Considering C2 link in RPAS design and certification. 
Description RPAS design should take into account potential interruption of the C2 
link and the impact it will have on the performance of the other system 
components. Duration of the interruption or the phase of flight may 
elevate the situation to an emergency. Appropriate abnormal or 
emergency procedures should be established to cope with any C2 link 
interruption commensurate with the probability of occurrence. This issue 
is related to the controllability of the full RPAS and the design of the 
control systems since the remote pilot will be controlling the RPA 
through the C2 link. There are also many operations-related human 
factors issues that are presented in the operations section of this 
document. 
 
The airworthiness implications of using a C2 link to pass control 
commands and information to and from the pilot and the RPA needs to be 
well understood and incorporated in the airworthiness standards. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Evaluate the impact on airworthiness certification of the inclusion of the 
C2 link as part of the control system and the systems to get information to 
the pilot from the RPA.  Coordinate these efforts with that of those 
addressing other related issues including system reliability and 
controllability. 
 
2.3.2 Continuing airworthiness 
 
AIR14: Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 
Description Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) are part of the 
certification package delivered to and approved by the certification 
authorities.  It will be important for the ICA to address all components 
that make up the RPAS (RPA, RPS, C2 link equipment and antennas, 
launch and recovery equipment, etc). 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Section 4.7 
Recommendations Analyze the needs for continued airworthiness information to address all 
components of the RPAS when developing updates to the standards.  
Include the need for information by different roles in the continuing 
airworthiness processes: Remote PIC and other remote pilots and flight 
crewmembers, remote observers, and maintainers of the RPA, RPS, C2 
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link, and other components. 
 
2.3.2.1 Maintenance manual 
 
AIR15: Maintenance Manual. 
Description The Maintenance Manual is part of the certification package delivered to 
and approved by the certification authorities.  It will be important to 
include information about maintenance requirements for all RPAS 
components. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Sections 4.12 and 4.16 
Recommendations Analyze the needs for maintenance information to be included in the 
Maintenance Manual for maintainers of all components of the RPAS 
(RPA, RPS, C2 link equipment and antennas, launch and recovery 
equipment) and consider the results when updating the standards. 
 
AIR16: Maintenance Manual –In-flight troubleshooting and fault rectification. 
Description There may be a need to perform troubleshooting and fault rectification of 
the RPAS while an RPA is airborne. Current RPAS operations sometimes 
involve in-flight troubleshooting such as diagnosing and correcting RPS 
console lock-ups, software problems, and problems with cable 
connections. 
 
The RPAS maintenance manual must include procedures for in-flight 
fault diagnosis and corrective actions that may be performed by 
maintenance personnel. It will need to be determined, on the basis of risk 
assessments, tasks that can reasonably be performed during a flight, and 
tasks that should not be undertaken during a flight.   Scheduled or 
preventative maintenance should not occur while an RPA is airborne 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Sections 4.12 and 4.16 
Recommendations Consider the need for the Maintenance Manual to include corrective 
maintenance procedures that may be safely performed during a flight.  
 
2.3.2.2 Flight recorders and voice recorders 
 
AIR17: Gathering useful flight recorder data. 
Description With no human life at risk or bodies to be recovered, there may be less 
need to locate the wreckage of RPAS from oceans or remote areas. As a 
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result, on-board flight recorders may be less likely to be retrieved, even 
though the information will still be valuable in understanding the causal 
factors of accidents.     
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Section 9.10 
Recommendations Where a record of data from on-board systems is needed for accident 
investigation purposes, consideration should be given to ground-based 
recorders instead of, or in combination with, on-board flight recorders.  
An evaluation should also be made about how to gather the information 
from the RPS that would typically be recorded on the FDR in a manned 
aircraft. 
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2.4 Command and control 
 
It is sometimes proposed that a shift from conventionally piloted to remotely piloted aircraft is 
partially analogous to moving from “fly by wire” to “fly by wireless”.  In light of the importance 
of the radio link to aircraft control, standards and practices that were developed for aviation radio 
communication systems may not be adequate when the radio becomes part of the aircraft control 
system.    
 
The human factors associated with the C2 link can be divided into two broad types, as follows.   
 
First, an understanding of the tasks performed by the pilot, and the operating environment in 
which these tasks will be performed, can help to define the capacity and required link 
performance (RLP) of the C2 link in terms of acceptable latency, availability, integrity and 
continuity (ICAO, 2006). For example, if the aircraft is to be controlled via direct manual inputs, 
then low latency may be a critical requirement. If the pilot will require video imagery from the 
aircraft, then the ability of the link to transmit large amounts of data becomes critical.  In general, 
as the level of automation on board the RPA increases, the requirements for link performance are 
relaxed, and vice versa.    
 
Second, in addition to managing the aircraft, the flight crew of a RPAS must manage the C2 link. 
Management and awareness of the link status may be particularly critical during control 
handovers, lost link and link resumption, when operating towards the limits of the signal, and 
during frequency changes.    
 
2.4.1 Human factors with implications for required link performance 
 
Before required link performance can be determined, it is necessary to understand the exchanges 
that must occur between the pilot and the RPA via the C2 link. The link must be capable of 
transmitting the necessary pilot control inputs to the aircraft and returning the information 
required for pilot displays. In each case, the exchange must be performed within a required time 
window and at the required quality.  
 
A distinction can be made between continuous control tasks and non-continuous control tasks. A 
continuous control task is one that requires constant human monitoring and control inputs that 
must often be performed within very a limited time window. An example is manual control of 
ailerons in an aircraft that is not equipped with an autopilot.  
 
Non-continuous control tasks involve discrete actions that do not involve constant monitoring or 
regular human inputs, and that can often be performed within a time window ranging from 
seconds to minutes. Examples are switching on landing lights, or supervisory control of 
automated systems via mode selections.  
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In general, continuous control tasks demand a higher level of link performance than non-
continuous control tasks. It is important to note however, that an RPA can have systems with 
several levels of pilot control operating at once. For example, a stability augmentation system 
may require no pilot involvement, a waypoint-based navigation system may require pilot 
monitoring and occasional inputs, whereas gear extension may require a discrete pilot selection.  
 
CC1: Link latency and manual control.  
Description Some UAS designs have involved the direct manual control of flight 
surfaces, either by a pilot within visual line of sight of the aircraft, or a 
pilot located in a control station equipped with “stick and rudder” 
controls. Latencies between control input and response can impede direct 
manual control. Lags of a second or more make manual control extremely 
difficult, and even lags as brief as 50 milliseconds can produce noticeable 
degradations of performance and lead to pilot induced oscillations 
(Welch, 2003). Control latencies may be most problematic when the 
control is via a geostationary satellite link (Mouloua, Gilson, Daskarolis-
Kring, Kring, & Hancock, 2001) or if the aircraft is being remotely 
piloted via a relay from another aircraft (Gawron, 1998).  
 
Although a proportion of the latency may result from over-the-air 
transmission time, processing at either end of the radio link can also 
contribute to latencies. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
United States MIL Standard 1472G (Department of Defense, 2012) states 
that UAS system transport delays between user input, system output, and 
display of system execution shall not exceed 100 milliseconds. However, 
it is not clear whether this requirement is intended to only apply to UAS 
under direct manual control. 
Recommendations 
 
UAS designs that rely on direct manual control of flight surfaces to 
ensure flight stability may not be feasible unless very small link latencies 
can be guaranteed. For most conditions, this will mean that some level of 
on-board flight control automation will be necessary.  
 
Where the stability of flight relies on on-board automation, protective 
measures should be taken to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent 
disengagement of the automation.  
 
 
CC2: Back-channel communication between RPAS pilots. 
Description RPAS operations may involve communication between geographically 
distributed personnel. An in-flight handover between RPS will require 
communication and coordination between personnel at each location. 
This may involve verbal or text-based communications. Flight crew may 
also need to communicate with support personnel located at the aircraft 
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during pre-flight and post-flight stages.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The C2 workgroup should consider whether back-channel communication 
is within its scope. If so, it should be determined how this communication 
should occur.  
 
 
 
CC3: Link latency may be sufficient to disrupt voice communications.  
Description In controlled airspace, all pilots on the same frequency are able to monitor 
voice transmissions due to the “party line” nature of the radio. This 
provides situational awareness, and also enables pilots to time their 
transmissions to minimize “step-ons”, in which two people attempt to 
transmit simultaneously. In busy airspace, it can become challenging to 
identify the brief gaps in which transmissions can be made. 
  
The communication and control architecture for RPAS operations may 
involve the relay of pilot voice communications from the ground to the 
RPA via either a terrestrial radio or a satellite link. The message will then 
be re-broadcast from the RPA via VHF or HF radio. The transmissions of 
other pilots and controllers will be relayed to the RPA pilot using the 
same system. The relay of voice communications from the RPS via the 
RPA will introduce a delay between the communications of the RPAS 
pilot with reference to other pilots on frequency. Some of this latency 
will be due to processing before and after signal transmission.  
 
Care must be taken to ensure that the latency between RPAS voice 
communications with reference to other pilots on frequency 
communications does not reach a level that disrupts communication.  
Several studies have examined the impact of voice latency on ATC 
communications (Nadler et al. (1992); Rantanen et al. (2004); 
Sollenberger et al.(2003);  Zingale et al. (2003) ). However it has always 
been the case in conventional aviation that all pilots on frequency are 
communicating with no between-pilot delays. No studies to date have 
examined the impact of voice latency between pilots.         
 
Telecommunications research has identified that round-trip transmission 
delay in the range of 500 ms gives considerable subscriber difficulties in 
telecommunications, and on tasks requiring complex verbal exchanges, 
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disruption can occur at significantly shorter latencies Kitawaki & Itoh 
(1991). ITU report G.114 notes that one-way transmission times below 
150 ms will not significantly affect most voice communication. 
  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Research is needed to determine the point at which latency starts to cause 
disruption when the voice communications of one pilot are delayed with 
reference to the voice communications of all other pilots on frequency. 
 
 
CC4: Loss of command link may also mean loss of communications and loss of some DAA 
capabilities. 
Description If the C2 link also carries pilot-ATC communications, and certain features 
of the DAA system are reliant on the link, then a loss of link may result in 
three abnormal conditions occurring simultaneously: (1) loss of pilot 
input to aircraft and loss of aircraft telemetry (2) loss of voice 
communications with ATC and (3) inability of pilot to interface with 
DAA system.  If only the uplink or downlink is interrupted, some pilot 
tasks may be affected while others may remain unaffected. For example, 
if uplink is lost while downlink remains, it is conceivable that the pilot 
may be unable to send commands to the aircraft or make radio 
transmissions via the aircraft, but may still have the ability to receive 
telemetry data and hear communications on frequency.    
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
In considering required link performance, all impacts of loss of links must 
be considered.  
 
 
CC5: Imagery from on-board cameras. 
Description Not all current RPAs are equipped with an on-board camera. Video 
downlinks can impose significant bandwidth requirements (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2010). Nevertheless, there are several 
potential uses of imagery from an on-board camera.  (1) Assisting with 
pilot situational awareness, including detecting the presence of airframe 
ice. (2) During approach to land, confirming that the aircraft is lined-up 
correctly and that a safe landing can be accomplished. (3) Risk mitigation 
in the event of an off-airport landing or ditching. 
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Related regulations 
or standards 
 
RTCA Special Committee 228 is considering the requirement for on-
board visual imagery, and may recommend that C2 links have the 
capability to downlink imagery in certain situations. 
Recommendations 
 
Consider the suitability of the requirements for on-board video included 
in the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) document 
to be released by RTCA Special Committee 228.  
 
 
2.4.2 Human factors considerations for monitoring and management of link 
 
In addition to controlling the aircraft, the crew of an RPAS must monitor and manage the C2 link, 
and their actions may positively or negatively impact the performance of the link. 
 
It must be decided whether the pilot should have an active role in managing the link, such as by 
selecting frequencies or transmission power, or whether the operation of the link will be 
automated. In the latter case, the pilot may still perform a monitoring role, remaining aware of 
current and predicted link performance.    
 
 
CC6: Crew actions and lost link. 
Description A full consideration of link performance must take into account not only 
the technical characteristics of the link architecture, but also the fragility 
or robustness of the link in the face of predictable human error, procedure 
deviations, or other human actions that could lead to signal interruptions. 
 
  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The C2 Workgroup should ensure that the human role in link 
management is considered.  
 
 
CC7: Human role in frequency assignment. 
Description It is unclear how frequencies will be assigned to each RPAS. A flight may 
involve the assignment of C2 frequencies during preflight planning, and 
further frequency assignments as the flight progresses. If frequency 
assignment will require human involvement, it will be necessary to 
examine the nature of this involvement  and the potential for system 
performance to be affected by human errors or procedure violations.  
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Related regulations 
or standards 
 
RPAS manual Section 11.4.1 
Recommendations 
 
In conjunction with the Operations Workgroup, the C2 workgroup should 
consider the human tasks that may be involved in frequency assignment, 
and how the performance of these tasks could affect safety and efficiency. 
 
CC8: Lack of information on prevalence of lost link. 
Description Although information on link losses is available from simulations and 
flight tests, there may be a need for statistical information on the 
frequency, duration and causes of link interruptions for current “real 
world” RPAS operations. It is expected that the patterns of link 
interruptions will vary according to the nature of the C2 link, terrain, 
environmental factors and flight characteristics. This information will 
have human factors implications for several areas including the design of 
operational procedures, DAA systems and procedures, pilot interactions 
with air traffic control, and risk assessments.   
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
A request for information should be made to member states to provide 
information on lost links experienced by “real world” RPAS operations.  
 
 
 
CC9: In-flight diagnosis of link degradation. 
Description In the event of an in-flight loss of link, or degradation in link quality, it 
may be necessary for the pilot to understand the cause of the problem, in 
order to take appropriate action. For example, different responses may be 
necessary according to whether the problem is related to interference 
from payload, intentional jamming, masking of the signal by terrain, or 
other causes.   
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The C2 group should consult with the Operations group to consider 
whether the pilot will be expected to diagnose the cause of link 
degradations, and if so, what information is needed to enable this to 
occur.  
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CC10: Do directional/tracking antennas (on the ground or in the air) change the nature of crew 
tasks? 
Description Tracking antennas for terrestrial radio systems may offer advantages such 
as resistance to interference and greater signal strength than 
omnidirectional antennas. However tracking antennas are more complex 
than omnidirectional antennas, and may require more monitoring by the 
crew. A failure of the antenna’s tracking system could lead to a lost link.  
It is unclear whether tracking antennas are more susceptible to human 
error than omnidirectional antenna systems.     
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Information should be gathered on the experience of RPAS operators with 
omnidirectional and directional antennas to identify if the operation of a 
directional antenna introduces additional human tasks or hazards.  
 
 
CC11: Pilot awareness of link quality. 
Description Pilots will require information showing link quality. This is likely to 
include link footprint and no-go areas where link will be masked by 
terrain or obstructions. The information will enable the pilot to monitor 
the current state of the C2 link and anticipate degradations.   
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
ICAO Manual section 13.2.6 
Recommendations 
 
In conjunction with the Operations group, the C2 workgroup should 
identify the information necessary to monitor and predict the performance 
of the C2 link. 
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2.5 Detect and avoid  
 
Despite their removal from the cockpit, pilots of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will be the 
final authority in maintaining a safe level of separation (i.e., “well clear”) between their aircraft 
and nearby traffic. The FAA and ICAO have thus far required pilots to ‘see and avoid’ other 
aircraft, where pilots rely on the visual acquisition of nearby traffic to ensure that they do not 
create a collision hazard. In response to this requirement, the UAS community has had to quantify 
well clear, a traditionally subjective concept, so that systems on board the aircraft and in the 
ground control station can help the ground pilot detect and avoid nearby traffic. The development 
of such a system requires careful design, with the abilities and limitations of the ground pilot 
taken into account. The rest of this section details eight considerations that need to be addressed 
before a viable detect and avoid system can be fielded. While the list is far from comprehensive, 
what follows are high-level issues that can be addressed by the community in the near term. 
 
 
DAA1: Inability to visually acquire target. 
Description It is unlikely that RPAs will be equipped with a camera that is capable 
of replacing the manned pilot’s ability to visually acquire nearby 
traffic. Current traffic avoidance systems in manned aviation are 
intended to serve as a supplement to the pilot’s ability to directly attend 
to traffic outside of their aircraft. The detect and avoid system, 
however, will be the pilot’s sole source of traffic information. The 
heightened role of the traffic display should be reflected in its design. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
A cockpit display of traffic information should be included in the 
ground control station that is capable of showing surrounding traffic at 
a sufficient range around ownship. The traffic display will also need to 
provide the pilot with sufficient information regarding nearby traffic, 
such as intruder position, direction, altitude, speed and vertical trend. It 
may also be necessary for the system to utilize a conflict detection and 
resolution algorithm that can provide the pilot with potential maneuver 
options, thereby reducing the cognitive load on the pilot.  
References 
  
 
 
 
DAA2: Definition of Well Clear. 
Description The self-separation (SS) function of a DAA system is a means of 
compliance with the regulatory requirements (14CFR Part 91, §91.111 
and §91.113) to “see and avoid” and to remain well clear of other aircraft. 
The concept of well clear has been proposed as an airborne separation 
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standard to which a DAA system must adhere, and performing SS 
correctly means remaining well clear of other aircraft.  In order to build a 
DAA system that helps the pilot remain well clear, that separation 
standard must be defined quantitatively. 
Well clear is defined as the state of maintaining a safe distance from 
other aircraft that would not normally cause the initiation of a collision 
avoidance (CA) maneuver by either aircraft. A well clear separation 
standard should be large enough to (1) avoid corrective maneuvers by 
intruders (i.e., any aircraft detected in range of the RPAS’s surveillance 
system) that are equipped with a CA system (e.g., Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)—or Airborne Collision Avoidance 
System (ACAS)), (2) minimize traffic alert issuances by air traffic 
control (ATC), and (3) avoid excessive concern for pilots of proximate 
piloted aircraft.  However, a well clear separation standard also should be 
small enough to prevent the need for large deviations that potentially 
disrupt traffic flow and ATC separation management plans (Consiglio et 
al., 2013; Federal Aviation Administration, 2013; Johnson et al., 2015; 
Weibel et al., 2011) 
 
The separation standard now used as the means for RPAs to remain well 
clear of all traffic derives from the work performed by the UAS Sense 
and Avoid Science and Research Panel (Cook et al. 2015), which was 
then modified by the FAA to account for the existing VFR and IFR 
separation of 500 feet, and now has concurrence from RTCA Special 
Committee 228 (Walker, 2014).   Its pedigree comes from the TCAS 
collision detection logic.  In order for the RPA to remain well clear with 
another aircraft, the following must be true: 
• Modified tau <= 35 seconds (i.e. analogous to time to closest 
point of approach (CPA)) 
• Horizontal miss distance <= 4000 feet (i.e. horizontal 
separation as extrapolated CPA) 
• Z Threshold <= 450 (i.e. current altitude separation standard) 
Related regulations 
or standards 
United States Code of Federal Regulations 14CFR Part 91, §91.111 and 
§91.113 
Recommendations Investigate the suitability for ICAO purposes of the well clear definition 
proposed by the United States UAS Sense and Avoid Science and 
Research Panel (SARP). 
 
 
 
DAA3: Alerting. 
Description The pilot needs to be adequately alerted with respect to a potential loss of 
well clear and/or legal separation.   This includes the logic as well as the 
alerts themselves.  The type (severity, urgency) of these alerts needs to be 
defined.  In addition, the parameters in which this alerts are activated 
need to be defined (see well clear).  Once these parameters are 
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established, the visual and auditory alerts need to be defined. 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RTCA DO 317b. 
 
Recommendations Review extant literature on this topic.  Adopt or develop based on the 
specific ICAO mission and need.  Evaluate in human in the loop 
simulations. 
 
 
DAA4: Level of Guidance. 
Description The guidance provided to pilots to remain well clear can take several 
forms of increasing information.  A basic “informational” display may 
only contain basic traffic information and alerting (based on the scheme 
above.  A “suggestive” display may provide the pilot with a range of 
potential solutions to solve the traffic conflict.  Whereas a “directive” 
display would inform the pilot of a single point solution to be executed.  
The appropriate level of guidance needs to be determined for this 
application along with the information elements that constitute that 
display. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Once the constraints are well defined (e.g., well clear, alerting)  determine 
the appropriate level of guidance by referring to previous evaluations or 
perform human in the loop simulations in this specific context. 
 
 
 
DAA5: Assessing the severity of a threat. 
Description The inability to look outside of the cockpit window places additional 
burden on the detect and avoid system, as the system must clearly 
convey the spatial relationship between the intruding aircraft and 
unmanned aircraft. The lack of in situ cues in the ground station must 
be taken into account when designing how and when the detect and 
avoid system attracts and orients the pilot’s attention.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
The detect and avoid system should explicitly declare the predicted 
threat level of nearby traffic using a multi-level alert structure that 
categorizes nearby traffic according to their predicted spatial and 
temporal proximity from ownship. Caution and warning-level visual 
and auditory alerts should be issued for traffic that is predicted to 
require immediate pilot awareness and/or corrective action. 
Furthermore, each level of the alert structure should correspond to an 
expected pilot action. 
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DAA6: Accommodating longer pilot response times. 
Description Existing UAS platforms utilize a variety of input methods to enable the 
UAS pilot to control the aircraft. Some of these methods (e.g., point-
and-click navigation controls) are associated with longer pilot response 
times than are seen with the standard method of control in manned 
aviation (i.e., hands-on stick-and-throttle). Paired with the inherent 
control link latencies found with the control on unmanned aircraft, UAS 
pilots may not be able to take positive control over the aircraft as 
quickly as can the pilots of manned aircraft. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
The detect and avoid system should alert the pilot with sufficient time 
so as to allow the pilot to assess the conflict and determine an 
appropriate response. The alerting system should take into account the 
potential for longer pilot response times as a result of different input 
control methods and link latencies. Furthermore, to minimize pilot 
response times, it may be advisable to provide suggestive guidance to 
pilots to assist in the determination of an appropriate maneuver 
References 
  
 
 
DAA7: Handling the transition between pilot-in-the-loop and fully autonomous response by the 
aircraft. 
Description It is assumed that the pilot will be ‘in-the-loop’ (i.e., responsible for 
implementing the response to the threat) during the detect and avoid 
function. However, if the pilot fails to make an appropriate maneuver, 
or if the aircraft ‘loses link’ with the ground control station, the aircraft 
must ultimately be capable of responding to the threat autonomously in 
order to avoid a midair collision (or near midair collision).  
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
The transition to autonomous response by the aircraft requires further 
study. The system should be designed to transition safely and to be 
viewed as acceptable and reliable by the pilot. 
References 
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DAA8: Presence of error in the surveillance sensors. 
Description The surveillance sensors that are utilized by the detect and avoid system 
are subject to position and velocity errors. These errors, which impact 
the ability of the surveillance sensors to accurately track nearby targets, 
in turn, have an impact on the ability of the conflict detection and 
resolution algorithm to appropriately evaluate their relative threat level. 
This ‘noisiness’ can result in both higher rates of ‘false alarms’ and 
‘misses’, both of which can negatively affect pilot’s trust of the detect 
and avoid system.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
The conflict detection and resolution algorithm(s) utilized by the detect 
and avoid system should utilize spatial and temporal buffers that can 
account for the presence of error in the surveillance systems. Further 
research is needed to optimize such buffers in the presence of real-
world data. 
References 
  
 
 
DAA9: The use of multiple surveillance sources. 
Description Multiple surveillance sources are required by the detect and avoid 
system. A transponder on the unmanned aircraft will be required in 
order to pick up nearby aircraft that are broadcasting their position, 
while an on-board RADAR (or an equivalent technology) will be 
necessary in order to track nearby aircraft and objects that are not 
equipped with a transponder. Each of these sources has its own inherent 
error and bias, which has an impact on the sort of maneuvers that pilots 
can make in response to the information. (Maneuvers made against 
targets tracked by TCAS, for instance, must be in the vertical dimension 
since the horizontal error present in TCAS is deemed excessive.)  
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
The detect and avoid system must be able to discern the source of the 
tracking information it is presenting to the pilot. It may be necessary to 
use different symbology in cases where the source of the information 
directly affects the pilot response. 
References 
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DAA10: Loss of command and control link. 
Description The loss of the command and control link between the ground control 
station and the aircraft is an inherent risk of unmanned systems. It is 
therefore possible that link is lost while the pilot is performing the 
detect and avoid function. Without mitigating factors, this could lead to 
a loss of well clear or a collision avoidance scenario with the unmanned 
system and the threat aircraft (Fern, Rorie & Shively, 2014). 
Related regulations 
or standards 
  
 
Recommendations 
  
The detect and avoid system should be capable of assessing when a loss 
of link has occurred and communicate that information to the pilot. The 
system should also have the capacity to make autonomous maneuvers 
onboard the aircraft so as to avoid midair collision. 
References 
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2.6 ATM integration  
 
The integration of RPAS operations into the Air Traffic Management system as a whole presents 
many challenges that may impact the tasks and responsibilities of air traffic control personnel and 
the policies and procedures that they use. 
 
ATM1: Impact of C2 link latency on party line information used by pilots. 
Description Several potential architectures may introduce latencies into RPA pilot 
voice communications. The impact of this on pilot-ATC and pilot-pilot 
(party line) communications is currently unknown. 
 
Latency in the delivery of RPAS communications to and from ATC 
through the C2 link may impact the flow of information with ATC and all 
the aircraft in their airspace.  This includes the potential for anticipated 
timing of making radio calls and possible increased likelihood of stepping 
on or interrupting other communications. 
 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consider the potential impact of latency in the C2 link communications 
between ATC and pilots when updating best practices and required 
procedures.  Include the impact on other pilots who will be in the airspace 
with the RPA and their need for relevant and timely party-line 
information.  
 
 
ATM2: Potential loss of party line information. 
Description RPA pilot – ATC voice architectures that rely on private ground 
connections may result in loss of “party line” communication where other 
pilots can maintain awareness.    
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consider the potential for safety consequences if pilots of other aircraft in 
a particular controlled airspace do not have access to the ATC 
communications with the pilot of an RPA in their airspace.  There may be 
a need for providing information to these other pilots about the state of 
the RPA or the fact that it has lost its communication link. 
 
 
ATM3: Impact of loss of C2 link on voice communications. 
Description If voice communications are also transmitted via C2 link, loss of C2 will 
also result in loss of voice communications until pilot establishes 
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communication with ATC by other means. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Develop policies and procedures for alternate means of communication in 
the event of lost C2 link when it is the routine method for pilot-ATC 
communication. 
 
ATM4: Potential for multiple RPAs going lost link simultaneously. 
Description It is possible that loss of a portion of the C2 infrastructure could result in 
multiple RPAs going lost link simultaneously.  
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Conduct research to assess the risk of this occurring and develop ATM 
policies and procedures as necessary based on the results. 
 
ATM5: ATM awareness of RPA lost link contingency options. 
Description Pilot and ATM awareness of how the RPA will behave during a lost link 
is critical to maintain the safety of the airspace.  It is important to have 
policies and procedures available to help the pilot and ATM personnel 
predict the behavior of the RPA and respond appropriately under a lost 
link situation. 
 
The procedures used for developing and communicating flight planning 
information and documents will be important to consider as well.  The 
flight plan should include the planned contingency flight path that the 
RPA will follow if the link is lost at any particular point in the flight.  
However, this may create some complexity for the controllers to refer to 
the plan and understand the anticipated behavior for the point of flight 
when the link is lost. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
 
Recommendations Consider options for planning, documenting, communicating, and using 
lost link contingency information and develop policies and procedures 
that will have minimal impact on on-going workload of the ATM 
personnel involved. 
 
 
ATM6: RPAS handling of ATM instructions including visual references. 
Description It is common practice for ATM instructions to include following another 
airplane or using other visual references. The Remote PIC will need 
access to equivalent information about those visual references to comply 
with these requests or the requests will not be able to be made by ATM 
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for RPAS. 
 
Controllers may not be able to expect to use these types of instructions 
with RPAS in their airspace.  If they do, it will be important for them to 
have an understanding of the alternate information that is being used by 
the remote PIC to respond to the requests. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 2.3.6 
Recommendations Consider the potential for remote pilots to respond to common requests 
that include reference to visual information and develop procedures for 
handling RPAS that cannot comply. 
 
2.6.1 Visual Flight Rules 
 
ATM7: RPAS flights under VFR. 
Description If an RPAS is operating under visual flight rules, the PIC must be able to 
ensure that the RPA stays in visual meteorological conditions.  This 
means that they must be able to assess meteorological conditions during 
the flight and take the appropriate actions if conditions change.  This is of 
particular importance during the take-off and landing phases. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 14.2.5, 14.2.7 “The remote pilot or RPAS operator must be 
able to assess the meteorological conditions throughout the flight. In the 
event the RPA, on a VFR flight, encounters IMC, appropriate action must 
be taken”. 
 
Recommendations Consider the limitations of a remote pilot for conducting VFR operations 
and in particular the unlikelihood of them identifying when the RPA has 
gone from a VMC to IMC situation.  Update the RPAS Manual and 
appropriate Annexes to disallow RPAS operations under VFR or require a 
means to maintain visual awareness of the meteorological conditions 
surrounding the RPA. 
 
 
2.6.2 RPAS unique procedures 
 
ATM8: Unique ATM procedures related to RPAS operations. 
Description There will likely be ATM procedures unique to RPAS operations that 
will be required to be developed, documented, and implemented.  It will 
be important to carefully consider these and include them in updates to 
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the standards. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 14.2.11, 14.2.12 
Recommendations Conduct research to define the RPAS-unique ATM procedures and use 
the results to update the standards. 
 
2.6.3 Flight rules 
2.6.3.1 Right-of-way 
 
ATM9: RPAS adherence to right-of-way rules. 
Description RPAs will be required to follow all existing right-of-way rules to 
integrate with the current ATM system. This will require the PIC to have 
the appropriate information and awareness of other aircraft on a 
continuing basis throughout the flight. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 14.3.1 
Recommendations Conduct research to understand the information that will be needed by 
Remote PICs to follow right-of-way rules and update appropriate 
standards. 
 
2.6.3.2 RPAS performance requirements 
 
ATM10: ATM awareness of RPAS performance capabilities and limitations. 
Description ATM providers are trained on the capabilities of different aircraft classes 
to be able to provide directions that are within their capabilities.  This will 
be particularly important for RPAS because the range of capabilities is so 
wide. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Section 14.3 
Recommendations Develop a full description of the range of anticipated RPA performance 
characteristics.  The minimum list of performance characteristics to 
consider from paragraph 14.3.4 of the RPAS Manual is 
a) speed; 
b) climb, descent or turn rates; 
c) wake turbulence; 
d) endurance; 
e) latency; and 
f) effect of bank angle on C2 and ATC communications link 
capability and reliability  
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Use the results to update standards to include how air traffic providers 
will handle RPAS of differing capabilities and how they will gain the 
knowledge about the performance characteristics.   
 
2.6.3.3 ATM procedures 
 
ATM11: Integration of RPAS into ATM procedures. 
Description Integration of RPAS may require modifications to current ATM 
procedures.  It will be important to effectively update the procedures and 
not leave it to the controllers to develop work-around practices on their 
own. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual 14.3.5, 14.3.6 
Recommendations Identify the ATM tasks that will need to be modified when integrating 
RPAS into their traffic management.  Modify procedures to include those 
tasks and clearly specify when the procedures should be applied. 
 
2.6.3.4 Flight plan 
 
ATM12: Including lost link information in flight plan. 
Description A standard method to include information about lost link procedures in 
the flight plan will need to be developed.  The standard will need to take 
into account the needs of all those who will develop or use the flight plan. 
Related regulations 
or standards 
RPAS Manual Section 14.3 
Recommendations Develop a description of the needs of all those who will prepare, file, or 
use the flight plan that includes the use each of them will have for lost 
link procedure information.  Use the description to update the standards in 
a way that will best work from all the varying perspectives. 
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3 List of considerations  
 
For ease of reference, the human factors considerations contained in this document are listed 
below. 
 
3.1.1 Personnel licensing 
 
 LIC1: Define licensing categories for remote pilots and other remote flight 
crewmembers. 
 LIC2: Identify in detail the knowledge and skill requirements for remote PIC, remote 
pilots, and other licensed remote flight crewmembers. 
 LIC3: Define licensing categories for RPA Observers. 
 LIC4: RPA Observer knowledge and skills. 
 LIC5: Define licensing categories for RPAS Maintenance personnel. 
 LIC6: Maintenance personnel knowledge and skills. 
 LIC7: Define licensing requirements for RPAS. 
 LIC8: RPAS instructor required skills and training. 
 LIC9: Consideration of the degradation of knowledge and skill retention for different 
licensing classes when determining license validity periods. 
 LIC10: Description of practical skill tests for each licensing class. 
 LIC11: Description of experience requirements based on the licensing classes. 
 
3.1.2 RPAS operations 
 
 OPS1: Predictability of lost link maneuvers. 
 OPS2: Criteria for declaration of lost link. 
 OPS3: Frequently exceeding lost link threshold. 
 OPS4: Potential for multiple simultaneous lost links. 
 OPS5: Flight crew interaction with aircraft. 
 OPS6: Perceptual illusions of RPAS operations. 
 OPS7: Landing/recovery at aerodromes. 
 OPS8: Vigilance, low workload and monotony. 
 OPS9: Rest breaks and crew rotations. 
 OPS10: Best practices for control handovers from RPS to RPS. 
 OPS11: Transfer of control between adjacent consoles in same RPS. 
 OPS13: Planning for ultra-long duration flights. 
 OPS14: Flight planning and C2 link considerations. 
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 OPS15: Planning for contingencies. 
 OPS16: Decision making for emergency landings, flight termination or ditching. 
 OPS17: Insurance considerations and emergency decision-making. 
 OPS18: Search and rescue. 
 OPS19: Control of a domestic RPA by a crew members in another state. 
 OPS20: Pilot interactions with payload. 
 OPS21: Interaction with on-board autonomous systems. 
 OPS22: Unique human factors training requirements for crew tasks. 
 OPS23: Physical safety and accessibility of the RPS. 
 OPS24: Electronic security procedures. 
 OPS25: Maintenance human factors. 
 OPS26: Intentional acts of operational personnel. 
 
 
3.1.3 Airworthiness 
 
 AIR1: Defining function allocation and pilot tasks. 
 AIR2: Ensure that the PIC will be able to maintain awareness of the state and behavior 
for all modes of the automated systems. 
 AIR3: Reduced sensory information. 
 AIR4: Ensuring controllability under all anticipated operating conditions, transitions 
between operating conditions, and all flight stages and aeroplane configurations. 
 AIR5: Control system design. 
 AIR6: Ensuring timely detection and response to a stall with use of the C2 link. 
 AIR7: Minimize risk of unidentified damage to RPA due to ground handling. 
 AIR8: Reliability of RPS systems, displays, controls, instruments, and equipment. 
 AIR9: Standards for RPS displays and controls. 
 AIR10: PIC access to dedicated back up for critical controls. 
 AIR11: Separate flight controls and payload controls. 
 AIR12: Maintaining security of RPS and flight crew. 
 AIR13: Considering C2 link in RPAS design and certification. 
 AIR14: Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 
 AIR15: Maintenance Manual. 
 AIR16: Maintenance Manual –In-flight troubleshooting and fault rectification. 
 AIR17: Gathering useful flight recorder data. 
 
 
63 
 
3.1.4 Command and control 
 
 CC1: Link latency and manual control. 
 CC2: Back-channel communication between RPAS pilots. 
 CC3: Link latency may be sufficient to disrupt voice communications. 
 CC4: Loss of command link may also mean loss of communications and loss of some 
DAA capabilities. 
 CC5: Imagery from on-board cameras. 
 CC6: Crew actions and lost link. 
 CC7: Human role in frequency assignment. 
 CC8: Lack of information on prevalence of lost link. 
 CC9: In-flight diagnosis of link degradation. 
 CC10: Do directional/tracking antennas (on the ground or in the air) change the nature of 
crew tasks? 
 CC11: Pilot awareness of link quality. 
 
 
3.1.5 Detect and avoid 
 
 DAA1: Inability to visually acquire target. 
 DAA2: Definition of Well Clear. 
 DAA3: Alerting. 
 DAA4: Level of Guidance. 
 DAA5: Assessing the severity of a threat. 
 DAA6: Accommodating longer pilot response times. 
 DAA7: Handling the transition between pilot-in-the-loop and fully autonomous response 
by the aircraft. 
 DAA8: Presence of error in the surveillance sensors. 
 DAA9: The use of multiple surveillance sources. 
 DAA10: Loss of command and control link. 
 
 
3.1.6 ATM integration 
 
 ATM1: Impact of C2 link latency on party line information used by pilots. 
 ATM2: Potential loss of party line information. 
 ATM3: Impact of loss of C2 link on voice communications. 
 ATM4: Potential for multiple RPAs going lost link simultaneously. 
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 ATM5: ATM awareness of RPA lost link contingency options. 
 ATM6: RPAS handling of ATM instructions including visual references. 
 ATM7: RPAS flights under VFR. 
 ATM8: Unique ATM procedures related to RPAS operations. 
 ATM9: RPAS adherence to right-of-way rules. 
 ATM10: ATM awareness of RPAS performance capabilities and limitations. 
 ATM11: Integration of RPAS into ATM procedures. 
 ATM12: Including lost link information in flight plan. 
 
 
4 Action by the meeting 
 
The meeting is invited to: 
a) note and review the contents of this working paper; 
b) refer the identified human factors considerations to Workgroups ; and 
c) agree that this document should be revised and updated periodically. 
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